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I. INTRODUCTION
When Casey Martin’s story hit the news, it was apparent that whatever resolution
was reached, it would be met with controversy. In the words of U.S. Supreme Court,
Justice Antonin Scalia,
It has been rendered the solemn duty of the Supreme Court of the United
States, laid upon it by Congress in pursuance of the Federal Government’s
power “to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States[]” . . . to decide What Is Golf. I am sure that the Framers of
the Constitution, aware of the 1457 edict of King James II of Scotland
prohibiting golf because it interfered with the practice of archery, fully
expected that sooner or later the paths of golf and government, the law
and the links, would once again cross, and that the judges of this august
Court would some day have to wrestle with that age-old jurisprudential
question, for which their years of study in the law have so well prepared
them: Is someone riding around a golf course from shot to shot really a
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golfer? The answer, we learn, is yes. [I]t will henceforth be the Law of
the Land, that walking is not a “fundamental” aspect of golf.1
As you can see, the controversy did not stop at the steps of the Supreme Court.
Martin is a professional golfer in his twenties who is stricken by KlippelTrenaunay-Weber Syndrome.2 This disability makes it medically impossible for him
to play golf without the use of a golf cart.3 The pain and swelling that results from
sustained periods of walking only slightly subsides when Martin elevates his leg.4
Using a golf cart provides only minimal relief from the pain Martin suffers while
golfing; indeed, he suffers pain even while he is at rest.5
Martin sued the PGA Tour in 1997 after his request to use a golf cart in a tour
event was denied.6 Martin made this request just prior to the third stage of PGA
qualifying school in Grenelefe, Florida, in which competitors are precluded from
using golf carts.7 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the decision of the United States District Court for the District of Oregon allowing
Martin to use a golf cart for PGA events.8 The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the
Ninth Circuit’s ruling.9

1

PGA Tour v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 700 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).

2

Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 204 F.3d 994, 996 (9th Cir. 2000), aff’d 532 U.S. 661 (2001).
Although both the District Court and Ninth Circuit refer to Martin’s affliction as KlippelTrenaunay-Weber Syndrome (“KTW”), that is a term no longer in use in the medical
community.
Website of Sturge-Weber Foundation, at http://www.sturgeweber.com/aboutkt.htlm. KTW was renamed to avoid confusion with Parkes-Weber
Syndrome. Id. Martin’s disease is correctly identified as Klippel-Trenaunay Syndrome
(“KT”), which is medically “characterized by a triad of signs: Port Wine Stain (capillary
malformations) covering one or more limbs, vascular anomalies, usually venous varicosities or
malformation and hypertrophy (enlargement of the limb) or atrophy (withering or smaller
limb). Id. KT involves the lower limbs in about ninety percent of the patients; in rare
instances, there is an absence of Port Wine Stain and not all three abnormalities need always
be present for the syndrome to exist. Id. Each case of KT is different, with patients having
varying abnormalities and severity. Id. Other associations with KT can include internal organ
involvement, hematuria (blood in the urine), rectal bleeding and vaginal bleeding. Website of
Sturge-Weber Foundation, supra. Bleeding from an abnormal lesion on the affected limb is
also common. Id. Patients may have sometimes including anemia, coagulation problems
(blood clots) and platelet trapping in the affected limb. Id.
3

Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1244 (D. Or. 1998), aff’d 204 F.3d 994 (9th
Cir. 2000).
4

Id.

5

Id. at 1243.

6

Martin, 204 F. 3d at 996.

7

Id. For a timeline that chronicles Martin and other similar cases, see Dahlia Lithwick, The
Wheels of Justice, GOLF J., Jan./Feb. 2001, at 22.
8

See generally Martin, 204 F.3d 994.

9

See generally PGA Tour, 532 U.S. 661.
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In a similar case that attracted much less media attention, professional golfer
Ford Olinger was also denied use of a golf cart in a professional golf event.10
Olinger, who “suffers from bilateral avascular necrosis, a degenerative [hip]
condition that significantly impairs his ability to walk,”11 requested the use of a golf
cart for play in qualifying rounds that proceed the 1998 United States Open.12 The
United States Golf Association (“USGA”), which conducts the US Open, denied
Olinger’s request, and Olinger thereinafter sued the USGA in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Indiana.13 After initially allowing Olinger
to compete in the qualifying rounds, the District Court, and subsequently the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, denied Olinger the use of a golf cart in events
governed by the USGA.14 Recently, the Supreme Court vacated the Seventh
Circuit’s ruling.15
Considering that both golfers’ claims were under the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 (“ADA”), and the facts and circumstances are almost identical in each
case,16 the opposite holdings reached by the courts of appeals is confounding.
Equally perplexing is the Supreme Court’s decision in Martin. This note will
indicate how the enlightened District Court for the Northern District of Indiana
correctly decided, and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed,
the Olinger matter. It will also highlight some of the many flaws in the Supreme
Court’s opinion in Martin.
This Note begins that task by giving, in Part II, a brief background of the ADA.
Part III closely examines the interpretation of the ADA that the District Court, the
Ninth Circuit, and the Supreme Court engaged in while deciding Martin. Part IV
provides a similar examination, except of the Seventh Circuit’s and the District
Court’s interpretation in Olinger. Part V explains how Martin and Olinger, as
professional golfers, do not meet the statutory definition of “disabled.” Part VI
examines why athletics, by their nature, should not be governed by the ADA. Part
10

See generally Olinger v. United States Golf Ass’n, 205 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 2000), reh’g
denied, reh’g en banc denied, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 14464 (June 22, 2000), vacated,
remanded 532 U.S. 1064 (2001), on remand, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 20379 (7th Cir. 2001).
11
Id. at 1001. Bilateral vascular necrosis, also referred to as osteonecrosis or aseptic
necrosis is “a disease that results from poor blood supply to an area of bone causing bone
death. This is a serious condition because the dead areas of bone do not function normally, are
weakened, and can collapse. . . .”
Website of Medfacts SportsDoc, at
http://www.medfacts.com/d_avn.htm. The affliction can be caused “by trauma and damage to
the blood vessels that supply bone its oxygen. Other causes of poor blood circulation to the
bone include an embolism of air or fat that blocks the blood flow through the blood vessels,
abnormally thick blood (hypercoaguable state), and inflammation of the blood vessel walls
(vasculitis).” Id.
12

Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1001.

13
Olinger v. United States Golf Ass’n, 55 F. Supp. 2d 926 (N.D. Ind. 1999), aff’d, 205
F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 2000).
14

Olinger, 205 F.3d 1001.

15

See Olinger v. United States Golf Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1064 (2001) (granting certiorari and
vacating Seventh Circuit decision based on PGA Tour v. Martin).
16

See generally Martin, 204 F.3d 994; Olinger, 205 F.3d 1001.
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VII concludes this Note by arguing that the Supreme Court should have followed the
reasoning of the Olinger courts and the logical analysis of dissenting Supreme Court
Justice Scalia, thereby denying Martin’s and Olinger’s ADA claims and preventing
the ADA from being applied to the substantive rules of competitive athletics.
II. BACKGROUND OF ADA
The stated purpose of the ADA, as set forth by Congress, is to provide a
“mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities[,]” to establish “clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards
addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities[,]” and to ensure the
federal government’s central role in enforcing these standards while invoking the
sweep of congressional authority.17
When instituted in 1990, the ADA “expand[ed] the basic protections of Titles II
and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 beyond prohibiting considerations of
personal characteristics such as race, religion, sex, or national origin . . . to
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of physical or mental disabilities.”18 Thus,
persons with disabilities victimized by discrimination were extended a cause of
action similar to that already available to members of other minority groups.
Congress found that an increasing number of Americans have one or more
physical or mental disabilities, estimating that number at forty-three million in
1990.19 Additionally, Congress found that our society isolates disabled individuals,
and discriminates against them in the areas of “employment, housing, public
accommodations, education, transportation, communication, recreation, . . . and
access to public services.”20 Also, unlike persons discriminated against based on
their race, color, sex, national origin, religion or age, persons discriminated against
based on a disability often have had no avenues through which to pursue a legal
claim.21 There was a need for such a claim based on Congress’ findings that disabled
persons regularly encounter various forms of discrimination, “including outright
intentional exclusion, the . . . effects of architectural, transportation, and
communication barriers, . . . exclusionary qualification standards and criteria . . . and
relegation to lesser services, programs, activities, benefits, jobs, or other
opportunities[.]”22
The various provisions of the ADA include the following: Title I deals with
employment issues, and is designed to prevent employers with fifteen or more
employees from discriminating on the basis of disability with respect to the terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment, which includes, but is not limited to
hiring, discharge, and promotion.23
17

42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (1994).

18

Wayne L. Anderson & Mary Lizabeth Roth, Deciphering the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 51 J. MO. B. 142, 142 (1995).
19

42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (1994).

20

Id.

21

Id.

22

Id.

23

Id. § 12112.
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Title II is focuses on public services, such as transportation services provided by
a state or local governments.24 Its purpose is to prohibit discrimination by reason of
disability in regards to the benefits of services, programs, or activities provided by a
public entity.25
Title III deals with public accommodations and services that are owned or
operated by private entities.26 Its purpose is to ban discrimination against disabled
individuals in the “full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by
any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public
accommodation.”27
Title IV of the ADA is titled “Telecommunications,” and provides regulations
applicable to the telephone and broadcast media.28 The purpose of this section is to
make media accessible to speech and hearing impaired persons through items such as
the Telecommunications Device for the Deaf—commonly known as TDD—and
close-captioned television programs.29
Title V denotes several miscellaneous provisions, including that homosexuals,
bisexuals, and transvestites are not disabled for purposes of this Act.30 Title V also
excludes individuals who engage in the illegal use of drugs from the definition of
disabled.31 Additionally, Title V delineates a claimant’s alternative means of dispute
resolution,32 and remedies, which include attorney’s fees.33
Titles II, IV and V are beyond the scope of this Note; however, a close
examination of Titles I and III follows in the discussion of Martin and Olinger, as
they are the provisions at issue in each case.
III. MARTIN V. PGA TOUR
A. District Court Decision
Casey Martin brought his ADA claim in the District Court for the District of
Oregon.34 Magistrate Judge Thomas M. Coffin presided in the District Court; he

24

Id. § 12132.

25

Id.

26

Id. § 12182.

27

Id.

28

47 U.S.C. § 225 (1994).

29

Id.

30

Id. §§ 12211, 12208 (1994).

31

Id. § 12210.

32

Id. § 12212.

33

Id. § 12205.

34

Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1320 (D. Or. 1998), judgment entered, 994 F.
Supp. 1242.
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wrote each of the court’s two opinions.35 The court examined Martin’s plight, which
was his attempt to gain membership to the PGA Tour, or the Nike Tour36—a “minor
leagues” also operated by the PGA—by competing in a three-stage qualifying school
tournament.37 The qualifying school is set up in stages:
The first stage consists of 72 holes. Those who score well enough in this
stage advance to the second stage consisting of 72 holes. The top
qualifiers, approximately 168 players, advance to the third and final stage
consisting of 108 holes. . . . [¶] In the first two stages of the qualifying
tournament, players are permitted to use golf carts. In the third stage, as
well as on the regular PGA Tour and Nike Tour, players are required to
walk. . . .38
As noted above, Martin suffers from a debilitating disease that “curtails blood
circulation in [his] leg. This condition has resulted in significant atrophy in the
lower leg and bone deterioration of the tibia . . . substantially limit[ing] his ability to
walk.”39 Thus, Martin asserted, by not allowing him to use a golf cart in the third
round of the qualifying school tournament, and subsequently on the PGA and Nike
Tours, the PGA is violating the ADA by not allowing him access to its
tournaments.40
Subsequent to his suit, the court granted a preliminary injunction ordering the
PGA to allow Martin to use a golf cart during the third stage of the qualifying school
tournament.41 As a result, the PGA lifted its no-cart rule as it applied to all
competitors, and after Martin qualified for play on the Nike Tour, the parties
stipulated to extending the injunction to the first two Tour tournaments.42
Martin’s three claims against the PGA were: First, under Title III, Martin
claimed that the PGA is a private entity that either is a place of public
accommodation, or operates a place of public accommodation.43 Thus, Martin
claimed that the PGA is in violation of the ADA by discriminating on the basis of
disability in the “full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,

35

Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1244. Judge Coffin ruled on two issues on the parties’ motions
for summary judgment: (1) the PGA is not exempt from the ADA because it does not qualify
as a “private club” under the statutory definition; and (2) the golf courses that the PGA uses
for its tournaments do meet the definition of “public accommodation” under the ADA. Id.
The court conducted a bench trial to dispose of the remaining issues.
36
The Nike Tour is now known as the Buy.com Tour. Subsequent references to that tour
will be “Nike Tour.”
37

Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1321.

38

Id. at 1321-22.

39

Id. at 1322.

40

Id.

41

Id.

42

Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1322.

43

Id.

2001-02]

LESSONS FROM MARTIN

347

privileges, advantages, or accommodations” of the PGA Tour.44 Second, Martin
claimed that PGA is a “private entity that offers examinations. . .related to licensing,
certification, or credentialing for professional. . .purposes.”45 Thus, they are subject
to the ADA requirement that such activity be done in a place and manner accessible
to persons with disabilities.46 Martin’s third claim was, as an employer, the PGA is
“prohibited from discrimination against a qualified individual with a disability
because of the disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring,
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and
other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.”47
The PGA challenged Martin’s claims, and countered with three defenses, each of
which was given thorough analysis in the court’s disposition of the motions for
summary judgment. Its first is that it is statutorily exempt from the ADA because it
is a private nonprofit establishment.48 The PGA argued in the alternative that, even
if it did not qualify for the private club exemption, its tournaments did not meet the
definition of “places of public accommodation,” and that the PGA and Nike Tours
are not examinations or courses.49 The PGA also argued that contrary to the third
count of Martin’s complaint, he is not an “employee” of the PGA or Nike Tours.50
Two issues were disposed of summary judgment: (1) whether the PGA is a
private club, exempt from the ADA, and (2) whether the PGA is a public
accommodation, thus being governed by the ADA. The court’s analysis of each is
discussed below. A bench trial followed, in which the remaining issues were
disposed.
1. Motions for Summary Judgment
The Martin court’s disposition of the motions for summary judgment ruled on the
issue of whether the PGA is exempt from the ADA as a private club,51 and whether
the PGA is, or operates, places of public accommodation.52 Judge Magistrate Coffin
declined to rule on whether Martin is an employee of the PGA, and whether the Tour
is a course or examination, deciding that those issues should be disposed of at trial.53
The issue of ADA exemption based on the PGA’s contention that it is a private
club was disposed of in Martin’s favor by the court, noting that “[b]ecause of the
importance of these laws, [the ADA and Civil Rights Act of 1964,] exemptions are
narrowly construed and the burden of proof rests on the party claiming the

44

Id.

45

Id.

46

Id.

47

Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1323.

48

Id.

49

Id.

50

Id.

51

Id. at 1326.

52

Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1327.

53

Id.
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exemption.”54 In its analysis, the court balanced PGA membership—relatively
small—against its purpose—to generate revenue for its members—in determining
that the PGA is not exempt as a private club.55 It compared Martin’s case to Welsh v.
Boy Scouts of America,56 which “found that the Boy Scouts was indeed a private club
notwithstanding its membership total of five million scouts.”57 The Welsh court
further asserted that:
Just as the large membership in the Scouts did not deprive the
organization of its private club status when its membership requirements
were fitted with the purpose of the group, so the relatively small
membership of the PGA Tour does not confer private status on [it] when
its selectivity is counterbalanced with the Tour’s purpose.58
Citing Quijano v. University Federal Credit Union59 and Webster’s Dictionary, the
Martin court stated that “[g]enerating revenue for members scarcely seems to qualify
as the type of protectable interest Congress had in mind when it excluded private
clubs from coverage under the ADA and Civil Rights Act.”60 The Martin court
compared the PGA to a credit union or auto club, which “are not clubs in any sense
of the word.”61
The Martin court then presented a detailed analysis of seven factors from United
States v. Landsdowne Swim Club,62 which are regularly used to determine whether an
organization is a bona fide private club.63 After its weighing of these factors, the
Martin court determined that the PGA is not a private club subject to ADA
exemption; the factors are: (1) genuine selectivity; (2) membership control; (3)
history of organization; (4) use of facilities by nonmembers; (5) club’s purpose; (6)
whether the club advertises for members; and (7) whether the club is nonprofit.64
The Martin court’s analysis of these factors, in turn, found that, although the
PGA is selective in its membership, like a club, the selectivity is not based on
“social, moral, spiritual, or philosophical beliefs, or any other . . . freedom of
54

Id. at 1323 (citing Nesmith v. YMCA, 397 F.2d 96, 101 (4th Cir. 1968); Quijano v.
Univ. Fed. Credit Union, 617 F.2d 129, 131-32 (5th Cir. 1980)).
55

Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1323.

56

993 F.2d 1267 (7th Cir. 1993). The court noted that Welsh stated a claim under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964; however, the “ADA and the Civil Rights Act are interrelated in terms and
application,” so the Welsh analysis is useful. Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1324 n.3.
57

Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1324.

58

Id.

59

617 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that a credit union was not exempt from Title VII
coverage under the “private membership club” exception).
60

Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1324.

61

Id.

62

713 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (holding that swim club was not a private club, but
rather a place of public accommodation).
63

Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1324.

64

Id. at 1324-25.
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association values which are at the core of the private club exemption. . . .”65 On the
contrary, the court found that the PGA’s selectivity is based entirely on skill; such
“selectivity is inherent to athletics, and does nothing to confer privacy to the
organizations to which professionals matriculate.”66
The Martin court noted that although the membership does have voting rights, it
does not vote on new members; rather, the new members play their way in.67 The
court neglected to note, however, that to enter qualifying school, the PGA does
require each potential member to submit two letters of recommendation from the
current membership, rendering it exclusive in that regard.68
Additionally, the Martin court found that since the PGA was formed prior to the
ADA and Civil Rights Act, it is indeed bona fide, but that doesn’t necessarily mean
it’s private.69 The court relied on the significant need for public participation—
through personal attendance and television audiences—in generating PGA Tour
revenue, thus this factor cuts against private club status, as does the Tour’s purpose,
which is discussed above.70
The court dismissed as irrelevant the advertising factor under Landsdowne,
noting that the PGA receives extensive media coverage, like most of professional
sports, thus it need not advertise for golfers.71 The PGA is a nonprofit corporation;
however, the court found that fact outweighed by the commercial interest of
generating revenue for its members.72 Thus, remarkably, this final Landsdowne
factor, as with the others, also cut against a “private club” finding, according to the
court.73 Accordingly, the court ruled that the PGA is not entitled to the private club
exemption under the ADA.74
The second issue before the Martin court was whether the PGA operates a place
of public accommodation at the golf courses on which it conducts tournament play.
The PGA’s contention was that the courses used are not open to the public during the
course of tournament play; thus, the events do not meet the definition of “places of
public accommodation” under the ADA.75 Title III of the ADA requires that
reasonable modifications be made to accommodate disabled persons using places of
public accommodation.76

65

Id. at 1325.

66

Id.

67

Id.

68

PGA Tour, 532 U.S. at 661.

69

Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1325.

70

Id.; see also supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.

71

Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1325.

72

Id.

73

Id.

74

Id.

75

Id. at 1326.

76

42 U.S.C. § 12182 (1994).
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The ADA denotes a list of specific “public accommodations.” The list includes:
gymnasiums, health spas, bowling alleys, golf courses, or “other place[s] of exercise
or recreation.”77
The PGA argued “that its courses are only places of public accommodation in
those areas actually accessed by the public at large. It contend[ed] that since the
public gallery is not allowed inside the playing area, the fairways and greens of its
golf courses are not places of public accommodation.”78
The Martin court dismissed the PGA’s contention with two separate assertions;
first, stating that the PGA’s argument would render the “private club exemption”
irrelevant.79 It made the claim that if a club was not found to be a “bona fide private
membership club,” as the PGA was, “it could nonetheless refuse to accommodate
any handicapped members by pointing out it only admits the country club’s members
(and not the public at large) on its grounds.”80
A second assertion made by the court is that the statute does not support the
concept of “zones of ADA application.”81 The PGA referred to:
cases wherein private facilities do not lose their exempt status on the
private portions of its facilities simply by operating a discrete public
accommodation area (e.g., a private country club renting space to a private
day care center open to non-members has ADA obligations only with
respect to the day care center, according to [Department of Justice]
regulations).82
The court did not see the logic in this proposition by the PGA, and dismissed
what it called “hop-scotch” areas of ADA enforcement.83 The court analogized the
Martin scenario to many other sports-related scenarios, including the dugout of a
baseball stadium, executive suites at an arena, caddies used by professional golfers,
and scenarios totally unrelated to sports, including reception halls, convention
centers, and private schools,84 failing throughout to recognize that there is no
competitive aspect in the latter examples as there is in professional golf.
In accordance with the above exploration of the Martin court’s analysis, the court
rejected the PGA’s assertion that the ADA does not apply to the competitive areas of
a golf course during PGA tournaments.85 And, this rejection, coupled with the
court’s disposition of the PGA’s prior defense, resulted in the court denying the
PGA’s motion for summary judgment.86 Accordingly, the court granted Martin’s
77

Id. § 12181(7)(L).

78

Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1326.

79

Id. at 1326.

80

Id.

81

Id. at 1327.

82

Id. at 1326.

83

Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1327.

84

Id.

85

Id.

86

Id.
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motion for partial summary judgment on the issues of whether the PGA qualifies for
a private club exemption from the ADA and whether it operates a place of public
accommodation.87
2. Bench Trial
Judge Magistrate Coffin’s bench trial opinion rendered judgment on the
remaining issues.88 The first is whether Martin is an employee of the PGA, thereby
triggering a Title I claim under the ADA.89 That issue, as well as the second issue,
whether the Nike Tour is a “course or examination” under the Act, were rejected by
the court without an explanation of its own.90 The court referred to, incorporated
into its opinion, and thereby endorsed, the PGA’s brief in support of summary
judgment on those two issues.91
However, the remaining issues are discussed in detail in the court’s opinion.
These issues are whether the accommodation that Martin requires—a golf cart—
would either fundamentally alter the nature of the tournament, or result in an undue
administrative hardship being placed upon the PGA, neither of which is required by
the ADA.92 The court stated that since it determined Martin to be an independent
contractor—and not a PGA employee93—the court’s focus would be on whether
Martin is entitled to the accommodation based on the “fundamental alteration” issue,
rather than the undue hardship issue, which it said was appropriate for
employer/employee relationships.94
The court began its analysis of said issues with illustrations of what it considered
“fundamental alterations” of an entity’s business or programs in response to the
needs of disabled persons.95 For instance, the court stated that if a blind customer
requests Braille books from a bookstore that normally does not carry such books,
“such an accommodation would fundamentally alter the nature of its business.”96
The court also recited an example of “fundamental alteration” given by the PGA: If
a day care center does not normally provide individualized care—one adult for each
87

Id.

88

Id. at 1242.

89

Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1247.

90

Id.

91

Id. at 1247 n.7.

92

Id. at 1244.

93

The court did not reveal how it determined Martin was an independent contractor, other
than to state he is not an employee of the PGA, preferring to keep that a secret. See id. at 1247
n.7; id. at 1245 n.2. However, exclusion from one category does not automatically mean
inclusion in another. Some statutes only apply to employers that employ a certain number of
employees. By the same logic, would those “employers” automatically acquire another
statutory definition, just because they failed to meet the statutory definition of employer? Of
course not.
94

Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1245 n.2.

95

Id. at 1245.

96

Id. (citing 28 CFR Ch. 1 Pt. 36, App. B at 632 (July 1, 1997)).
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child—and a disabled child requests such an accommodation, the day care center is
not required to give such care because it would fundamentally alter the nature of the
service that the center provides.97
The court next reviewed appellate case law regarding the application of the ADA
to sports programs. It first examined two Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals cases that
upheld Michigan High School Athletic Association’s (MHSAA) eligibility
requirements, McPherson v. MHSAA,98 and its predecessor, Sandison v. MHSAA.99
In McPherson, the court considered the MHSAA’s rule that limits athletic eligibility
for student-athletes to eight semesters of interscholastic competition.100 McPherson
ruled that even though the plaintiff had a learning disability that prevented him from
completing high school in eight semesters, the rule was necessary, in part, to “limit
the level of athletic experience and range of skills of the players in order to create a
more even playing field for the competitors….”101 The Sandison court held like
McPherson, that “individually determining whether each older student possessed an
unfair advantage was not a reasonable accommodation,”102 while holding that
waiving an age regulation would fundamentally alter the athletic program.103
In Pottgen v. MSHAA,104 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals also determined that
the “age requirement was essential to the high school athletic program and that an
individualized inquiry into the necessity of the requirement [in each] case was
inappropriate.”105
The Martin court then briefly reviewed three district court cases cited by the
PGA, all of which made determinations on the eligibility of competitors based on
individualized inquiries.106 Based on this limited application of ADA law to
athletics,
the PGA asserts that the court should focus on whether an athletic rule is
“substantive”—i.e., a rule which defines who is eligible to compete or a
rule which governs how the game is played. If it is [substantive] ... the
rule cannot be modified without working a fundamental alteration of the

97

Id.

98

119 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 1997).

99

Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1245 (citing 64 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir. 1995)).

100

Id. (citing McPherson, 119 F.3d at 456).

101

Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1245, n.4.

102

Id. (citing Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1037).

103

Sandison, 64 F.3d 1026.

104

40 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 1994).

105

Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1245 (citing Pottgen, 40 F.3d at 930).

106

Id. at 1245 (citing Johnson v. Florida High School Athletic Activities Ass’n 899 F.
Supp. 579 (M.D. Fl. 1995), vacated as moot 102 F.3d 1172 (11th Cir. 1997); Dennin v. Conn.
Interscholastic Athletic Conference, 913 F. Supp. 663 (D. Conn 1996), vacated as moot 94 F.
3d 96 (2d Cir. 1996); Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 974 F. Supp. 459 (D.N.J.
1997)).
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competition, and the ADA consequently does not require any
modification to accommodate the disabled.107
The court, however, noted that all of the cases cited by the PGA to support its
position examined the purpose of the rule in question to determine if the
modification was reasonable.108
The Sandison and McPherson courts noted that the purpose of the eligibility rule
is closely tied to the purpose of interscholastic athletics.109 Martin summed up that
purpose as “allow[ing] students of the same age group to compete against each
other.”110 Allowing the learning disabled plaintiffs to compete, according to Martin,
would “fundamentally alter[] the nature of the services at issue.”111 The court
claimed that the skill level of the plaintiffs is irrelevant; high school athletics are
only for students in the fourteen to eighteen years age group.112 Additionally, the
court in Bowers v. National Collegiate Athletic Association ruled that a waiver of the
curriculum requirement for college athletes at issue there would alter the
fundamental nature of the program, by allowing unqualified students to compete.113
The Martin court, however, stated that athletic associations do not have
unfettered discretion in this area of rulemaking, illustrating that a rule prohibiting the
use of corrective lenses during competition would not be immune from the ADA just
because it would alter a rule of competition.114 The court conceded that the PGA
Tour, and professional sports in general, enjoy a high profile, and possess a high
level of skilled competition, but claimed that the analyses of ADA questions do not
change from the high school to professional sports level.115 “[I]f it is unreasonable to
accommodate Casey Martin’s disability with a golf cart at the PGA Tour level
because of its rules of competition, it is equally unreasonable to so accommodate a
similarly disabled golfer at the high school level if the same rules were
applicable.”116
Additionally, the court found no difference in ADA enforcement between
athletics than any other area, stating: “[T]he disabled have just as much interest in
being free from discrimination in the athletic world as they do in other aspects of
everyday life.”117
107

Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1246.

108

Id.

109

See supra notes 98-103, and accompanying text.

110

Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1246.

111

Id.

112

Id.

113

Bowers, 974 F. Supp. at 459, cited in Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1245.

114
Id. at 1246. How severe would a sight-impairment have to be to qualify as a disability
under the ADA? In other words, is the example given by the court even relevant to the
discussion of this issue?
115

Id.

116

Id.

117

Id.
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The court next provided an overview of the ADA, and how it applies to this case,
concentrating specifically, and appropriately, on Title III.118 It noted that Martin has
the burden of demonstrating that he is disabled,119 and that a modification was
requested and that the modification was reasonable.120 The PGA received his request
for a golf cart, and the court stated “the use of a golf cart is certainly not
unreasonable in the game of golf.”121
The evidence, the court argued, demonstrating that the use of a golf cart is
reasonable is that the Rules of Golf do not require walking; and the PGA Tour does
not require walking on its Senior Tour, or for the first two rounds of its qualifying
school competition.122 In those two types of tournaments, the PGA does not
handicap or penalize competitors that choose to use a golf cart.123
Johnson v. Gambrinus Co. is followed by the court in determining whether the
modification—golf cart—is reasonable.124 Gambrinus ruled that an ADA plaintiff
must first show that the modification requested is generally reasonable.125 So, Martin
first had to show that golf carts are reasonable in golf, generally, without regard to
the PGA Tour itself. Thus the court found that the permitted use of golf carts at
levels of inferior competition, i.e., Senior PGA Tour and PGA qualifying school, are
“compelling evidence that even the PGA Tour does not consider walking to be a
significant contributor to the skill of shot-making.”126 Additionally, the court cited
the fact that the National Collegiate Athletic Association and the Pacific Ten
Conference allow golf carts to be used by disabled golfers as evidence to meet the
plaintiff’s burden that the accommodation is “reasonable.”127
After it was satisfied that Martin had met his burden, the court’s next step was to
analyze whether the PGA Tour met its burden of proof that Martin’s use of a golf
cart would “fundamentally alter” the nature of its public accommodation.128 If that

118

Id. at 1247.

119

Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1244. The PGA Tour stipulated to Martin’s disability, and to
the fact that his disability prevents him from walking the course during a round of golf. Id.
One could argue against such stipulation. See Part V, infra.
120

Id. at 1248.

121

Id.

122

Id. The Senior PGA Tour is open only to competitors of fifty years of age or greater.
Id. at 1249 n.9.
123

Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1248.

124

Johnson v. Gambrinus Co. 116 F.3d 1052 (5th Cir. 1997) (allowing guide dog to
accompany blind patron on brewery tour), cited in Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1249.
125

Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1248 (citing Gambrinus, 116 F.3d at 1059).

126

Id.

127

Id. The NCAA and the Pac-10 Conference were the two governing bodies that
permitted Martin to use a golf cart while playing college golf for Stanford University in Palo
Alto, California. Id.
128

Id. at 1249.
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burden is not satisfied in an ADA case, the defendant must provide the
modification.129
The PGA, citing Pottgen, stated that an individualized inquiry into the necessity
of the walking rule here is inappropriate.130 The court cited Gambrinus,131 Crowder
v. Kitagawa,132 and Stillwell v. Kansas City,133 in reaching its determination that “the
ultimate question in this case is whether allowing plaintiff, given his individual
circumstances, the requested modification would fundamentally alter PGA and Nike
Tour competitions.”134
The Martin court next tracked the terms of walking and golf cart use throughout
The Rules of Golf, finding that nowhere is walking required or defined as essential to
the game.135 It also noted that the USGA permits golf cart use unless otherwise
prohibited.136 According to the “Transportation” portion of the Conditions of
Competition and Local Rules promulgated by the PGA Tour, which governs the
PGA and Nike Tour events, “Players shall walk at all times during a stipulated round
unless permitted to ride by the PGA Tour Rules Committee.”137 The court noted that
there is no written policy regarding the determination of when a waiver of the
walking requirement is appropriate.138 When the walking requirement has been
waived, it has been waived for all players, and it has never been waived under
individualized circumstances, such as Martin’s disability.139
The court also went into excruciating detail through additional discussion of
Martin’s disability, and the lengths Martin went, in order to play golf without a golf
cart.140 The court, on two occasions, interjected an illustration of the similarity

129

Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1249.

130

Pottgen, 40 F.3d at 930-31, cited in Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1249.

131

Gambrinus,116 F. 3d 1059.

132

81 F.3d 1480 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that statewide carnivorous animal quarantine
effectively prevented blind travelers from entering Hawaii, and without reasonable
modification, quarantine violates ADA).
133

872 F. Supp. 682 (W.D. Mo. 1995) (holding that per se exclusion of one-handed
applicants for armed security guard license is in violation of ADA and Constitutional due
process rights).
134

Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1249.

135

Id. THE RULES OF GOLF are promulgated by the USGA and the Royal and Ancient Golf
Club of St. Andrews, Scotland. Id.
136

Id.

137

Id.

138

Id.

139

Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1249.

140

Id. As stated above, the PGA does not contend the severity of Martin’s disability, or the
extent to which it limits his ability to play golf without a golf cart. See supra notes 48-50 and
accompanying text.
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between a disabled airline passenger and Martin, again overlooking the competitive
nature of golf, and the lack of competition (by passengers) in air travel.141
The court noted that the PGA’s stated purpose for the walking rule is “to inject
the element of fatigue into the skill of shot-making.”142 It found that under the ADA,
that purpose is “cognizable,” whereas if the PGA cited “tradition,” that would not
have been a cognizable purpose.143 The court then went through an extensive
analysis of walking while playing golf, only to determine that the fatigue factor is
insignificant under normal circumstances.144 Testimony was offered at trial from
which the court concluded that because walking is often chosen over riding in a golf
cart on the Senior Tour and PGA qualifying rounds, walking must not inject
additional fatigue into the competition as the PGA claimed.145
Martin’s disability is so severe that the court found any fatigue which is injected
into the competition has a more profound effect upon Martin, so he couldn’t be put at
a competitive advantage by gaining the use of the golf cart.146 “The other golfers
have to endure the psychological stress of competition as part of their fatigue; Martin
has the same stress plus the added stress of pain and risk of serious injury.”147
Before holding that the “requested accommodation of a cart is eminently
reasonable in light of Casey Martin’s disability,”148 the court went through a
hypothetical application of another one of The Rules of Golf to the ADA, again
reaching the conclusion that the analysis of reasonableness must be on a
individualized basis.149
B. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Decision
The PGA appealed the District Court decision to the Ninth Circuit.150 The Court
of Appeals examined the same issues did the District Court, taking a detailed look at
the terms “public accommodation,” and “reasonable modification.”151
141

Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1249. For fully developed version of this analogy, see id. at

1247.
142

Id. at 1249.

143

Id. at 1250.

144

Id.

145

Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1251.

146

Id.

147

Id. at 1251-52. The illogic of the court’s statement is astounding. Obviously, all
golfers do not compete with the same skill-set or physical attributes; that doesn’t mean the
rules should be changed for some to compensate for the lack or presence of certain skills or
attributes.
148

Id. at 1253.

149

Id. at 1252-53 (stating that a rule—intended purely for recreation golf—allowing a
blind golfer to have a coach with him on the course requires the same individualized
assessment as the cart rule of issue in Martin).
150
See generally Martin, 204 F.3d 994. A three judge panel ruled on the PGA’s appeal of
the Martin decision; the panel was composed of Senior Circuit Judge William C. Canby, who
wrote for the court, Circuit Judge Thomas G. Nelson, and Judge Jeremy Fogel from the
District Court for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation. Id.
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The Ninth Circuit’s analysis of the definition of the term “public
accommodation” differed from the District Court’s in one respect: The Ninth Circuit
ruled that even if the golf course does not qualify under “golf course . . . or other
place of exercise or recreation,” it must qualify as “theater, stadium or other place of
exhibition or entertainment.”152
The court then cited a number of cases dealing with student-athletes to
demonstrate how the ADA does indeed apply to athletics, but none deal with a
substantive rule of competition.153 The only case cited by the court that even
approaches waiving a substantive rule is Anderson v. Little League Baseball.154 In
that case, the court held that Title III applies to the coaches’ box on a baseball field,
but in no way implicates a player, let alone how that player would play the game.155
The Ninth Circuit, much like the District Court below, also found that the ADA
cannot be compartmentalized within a golf course.156 This court also stated that
much like the PGA, private universities have very competitive entry standards, but
that does not bar those universities from ADA enforcement.157
The court held, and thereby unanimously affirmed the District Court’s ruling on
the issue that golf courses remain places of public accommodation while a PGA
Tournament is being held on them.158 The court did not “see any justification for
drawing a line between use of a place of public accommodation for pleasure and use
in the pursuit of a living.”159
The court next explored whether the use of a golf cart by Martin is a “reasonable
accommodation” under that ADA, or whether the accommodation would
“fundamentally alter” the nature of goods or services of the PGA Tour.160 The court
for the most part adopted the findings of the court below and found that they are not

151

Id.

152

Martin, 204 F.3d at 997 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12187(7)(C) (1994)). The PGA argued that
tour golfers are not exercising or recreating—they are trying to win money, so the golf course
doesn’t qualify under that provision of the ADA. Id. The court then mysteriously concluded,
“[i]f a golf course during a tournament is not a place of exercise or recreation, then it is a place
of exhibition or entertainment.” Id. Note, however, that just because an entity isn’t covered
under one section of a statute, doesn’t automatically mean it is covered under another. See
note 93, supra.
153

Id. at 998 (citing Bowers v. NCAA, 9 F. Supp. 2d 460 (D. N.J. 1998) (academic
ineligibility of football player); Tatum v. NCAA, 992 F. Supp. 1114 (E.D. Mo. 1998)
(academic ineligibility of basketball player); Ganden v. NCAA, No. 96 C 6953, 1996 WL
680000 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 21, 1996) (academic ineligibility of swimmer); Anderson v. Little
League Baseball, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 342 (D. Ariz. 1992)).
154

794 F. Supp. 342.

155

Martin, 204 F.3d at 998 (citing Anderson, 794 F. Supp. at 344).

156

Id.

157

Id.

158

Id. at 999.

159

Id.

160

Martin, 204 F.3d at 999.
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clearly erroneous.161 It noted, however, that the District Court’s finding that the use
of a golf cart does not provide a golfer with a competitive advantage over a golfer
who walks, distinguishes this case from Olinger.162
The court concluded through a de novo review, therefore, that under Title III of
the ADA, a golf course is a place of public accommodation while the PGA is
conducting a tournament.163 Additionally, the court found no errors in the
determination of the court below that providing Martin with a golf cart was a
reasonable accommodation that did not fundamentally alter the nature of the PGA
and Nike Tour events, and thereby affirmed the lower court’s ruling.164
C. United States Supreme Court Decision
1. Majority Opinion
On January 17, 2001, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Martin.165
Although Olinger was not consolidated with Martin for purposes of this appeal, the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Martin, in effect, controlled the outcome of Olinger.166
On May 29, 2001, the Court released its opinion in Martin, affirming the Ninth
Circuit decision.167 The Court’s decision, with Justice John Paul Stevens writing for
the seven-to-two majority, focused on two questions: “Whether the Act protects
access to professional golf tournaments by a qualified entrant with a disability,” and
“whether a disabled contestant may be denied the use of a golf cart because it would
‘fundamentally alter the nature’ of the tournaments … to allow him to ride when all
other contestants must walk.”168
With respect to the first question, the Court focused on whether the courses the
PGA leases in order to hold their tournaments meet the ADA’s definition of “places
of public accomodation,” and found that they “fit comfortably.”169 The Court also
ruled that Martin fell within the Act’s protection as a statutory “individual.”170 The
Court ruled that the PGA offers as one its “privileges” the chance to compete in
qualifying school, and play in the tour events, and dismissed the PGA argument that
the competitors in their tournaments are not the class protected by Title III.171 The
Court, in fact, found the PGA offers “privileges” to two separate groups, those who
161

Id. at 999-1001.

162

Id. at 1002 n.9 (citing Olinger, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 935).

163

Id. at 1002.

164

Id.

165

PGA Tour, 532 U.S. 661 (2001); see also 2001 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 2.

166

See Olinger, 532 U.S. 1064 (granting certiorari, vacating the judgment of the Seventh
Circuit, and remanding the case for consideration in light of Martin).
167

PGA Tour, 532 U.S. 661.

168

Id. at 664-65.

169

Id. at 677.

170

Id.

171

Id. at 677-78.
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watch, and those who compete.172 The Court relied on Daniel v. Paul,173 Evans v.
Laurel Links, Inc.174 and Wesley v. Savannah,175 to support the contention.176 In those
cases, however, the “participants” were not professional athletes, but rather amateurs
playing games for enjoyment, not profit.177 Furthermore, Daniel and Evans
interpreted Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and were merely allowing access
to the event, not changing the rules of it.178
As to the second question, the Court ruled that providing Martin with a cart
would not “fundamentally alter” PGA-sponsored events.179 The Court, without
regard to the rule-making autonomy of professional (or amateur) sports
organizations, began its discussion by noting that “the use of golf carts is not itself
inconsistent with the fundamental character of the game of golf.”180 The Court next
meandered through a history of golf, and its rules, to demonstrate its view that the
walking rule is of limited import to the game, historically and presently.181 The
PGA’s argument, however, is that at golf’s highest level, the PGA Tour, the purpose
is “to assess and compare the performance of different competitors, a task that is
meaningful only if the competitors are subject to identical substantive rules … [and
that t]he waiver of any possibly ‘outcome-affecting’ rule for a contestant would
violate this principle … [and thus] fundamentally alter the nature of the … event.”182
The Court dismissed that claim, stating that the weather and luck play a role in
determining the outcome, thereby mitigating the force of the PGA argument.183
Ultimately, the Court determined that granting Martin a waiver of the walking rule
would not fundamentally alter the PGA brand of tournament golf, and affirmed the
judgment of the Ninth Circuit.184
172

PGA Tour, 532 U.S. at 679-80.

173

Id. at 680 (citing Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969)).

174

PGA Tour, 532 U.S. at 680 (citing Evans v. Laurel Links, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 474, 477
(E.D. Va 1996)).
175

PGA Tour, 532 U.S. at 680 (citing Wesley v. Savannah, 294 F. Supp. 698 (S.D. Ga.

1969)
176

PGA Tour, 532 U.S. at 680 (citing Daniel, 395 U.S. at 306; Evans, 261 F. Supp. at 477;
Wesley, 294 F. Supp. 698).
177

PGA Tour, 532 U.S. at 680.

178

Id. (citing cases in notes 173-74, supra).

179

Id. at 689 (“[T]he walking rule is at best peripheral to the nature of [PGA] athletic
events…”).
180

Id. at 683.

181

Id. at 683-88.

182

PGA Tour, 532 U.S. at 686.

183

Id. The dissent opines, “I guess that is why those who follow professional golfing
consider Jack Nicklaus the luckiest golfer of all time, only to be challenged of late by the
phenomenal luck of Tiger Woods…. ‘Pure chance’ is randomly distributed among the
players, but allowing [Martin] to use a cart gives him a ‘lucky’ break every time he plays.” Id.
at 701-02 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
184

Id. at 690-91.

360

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol. 16:341

2. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Antonin Scalia, however, with whom Justice Clarence Thomas joined,
dissented from the Court’s opinion.185 Throughout a well-reasoned and superblywritten opinion, Justice Scalia set forth logical arguments demonstrating how the
Court’s “opinion exercises a benevolent compassion that the law does not place it
within [its] power to impose,” and, “distorts the text of Title III, the structure of the
ADA, and common sense.”186
Besides dissenting from the majority’s view on the effect of luck and chance on
professional golf,187 the dissent also disagreed with the Court’s application of the
terms “customer” and “client,” stating that under the majority’s application, the
persons gathering at an auditorium would be covered by Title III, as would those
who contracted to clean it.188 Similarly, the persons recreating at a zoo would be
covered by Title III, as would the animal handlers bringing in the pandas.189 In
addition, the dissent finds unreasonable the majority’s position that employees
exempted from Title I coverage (i.e., independent contractors and employees of
businesses employing fewer than fifteen persons) are covered under Title III because
such employees “enjoy the employment and contracting that such places provide.”190
The dissent also points out that Martin “did not seek to ‘exercise’ or ‘recreate’ at the
PGA … events; he sought to make money (which is why he is called a professional
golfer).”191 It is no surprise that the dissent concluded that it is impossible for
athletes to be “customers” of the PGA, because that organization pays them.192
The dissent also addressed what it found to be another grave error on the
majority’s part, viz, its interpretation of, “access to.”193 The dissent stated the “PGA
… cannot deny [Martin] access to [its] game because of his disability, but it need not
provide him a game different (whether in its essentials or in its details) from that
offered to everyone else.”194 The dissent also noted the statute was not designed to

185

Id. at 691-705 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

186

PGA Tour, 532 U.S. at 691.

187

See supra note 167 and accompanying text.

188

PGA Tour, at 693.

189

Id.

190

Id. at 694. See also supra note 93.

191

PGA Tour, 532 U.S. at 696.

192
Id. at 697. The dissent thoroughly analyzed this point. See, e.g., id. at 695. (“[N]o one
in his right mind would think that [baseball players] are customers of the American League or
of Yankee Stadium. They are themselves the entertainment that the customers pay to
watch.”); see also id. at 697 (“By the Court’s reasoning, a business exists not only to sell
goods and services to the public, but to provide the ‘privilege’ of employment to the public,
wherefore it follows, like night the day, that everyone who seeks a job is a customer.”).
193

Id. at 703.

194

PGA Tour, 532 U.S. at 699. On this point, the dissent states, in discussing whether shoe
stores must sell single shoes for one-legged persons, that there is “no basis for considering
whether the rules of … competition must be altered. It is as irrelevant to the PGA’s …
compliance with the statute whether walking is essential to the game of golf as it is to [a] shoe
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ensure that Martin’s “disability will not deny him an equal chance to win
competitive sporting events.”195 In concluding its opinion, the dissent offers this
statement, which aptly summarizes its position:
Agility, strength, speed, balance, quickness of mind, steadiness of nerves,
intensity of concentration—these talents are not evenly distributed. No
wild-eyed dreamer has ever suggested that the managing bodies of the
competitive sports that test precisely these qualities should try to take
account of the uneven distribution of God-given gifts when writing and
enforcing the rules of competition. And I have no doubt Congress did not
authorize misty-eyed judicial supervision of such a revolution.196
IV. OLINGER V. USGA
A. District Court Decision
The case of Ford Olinger was, for some reason, much less publicized than that of
Casey Martin. Olinger, like Martin, is a professional golfer with a physical
impairment.197 Olinger, a club pro from Warsaw, Indiana,198 was eligible for, and
desired to, compete in, the 1999 U.S. Open qualifying rounds held at South Bend
Country Club in Indiana.199 The U.S. Open is one of thirteen national championships
conducted by the USGA each year.200 The USGA prohibits the use of golf carts in
the Open, and in the qualifying rounds that precede it.201
Olinger suffers from bilateral avascular necrosis, which significantly impairs his
ability to walk, and makes a golf cart necessary for the completion of an eighteen
hole round of golf.202 Thus, Olinger filed suit against the USGA under Title III of
the ADA, seeking an order allowing him to use a golf cart while competing in the
U.S. Open qualifying rounds.203

store’s compliance whether ‘pairness’ is essential to the nature of shoes.” Id. at 698 (quoting
Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 560 (7th Cir. 1999). Further, Scalia offered,
“[w]hy cannot the PGA …, if it wishes, promote a new game, with distinctive rules (much as
the American League promotes a game of baseball in which the pitcher’s turn at the plate can
be taken by a designated hitter?” Id. at 699.
195

Id. at 703.

196

Id. at 703-04.

197

Olinger, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 929.

198

Lithwick, supra note 7, at 22.

199

Olinger, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 929.

200

Id. at 928.

201

Id. at 929.

202

Id.

203

Id.
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The District Court opinion is divided into two parts: One that is based on the
motion for summary judgment filed by the USGA, and the other based on a bench
trial.204
1. Motion for Summary Judgment
The USGA argued that the U.S. Open is not “public,” nor is it a “place,” so it
certainly could not be a “place of public accommodation” under the ADA.205 Since
the USGA does allow certain amateurs to participate in the U.S. Open and its
qualifying rounds, the court does find that it is “public.”206
Olinger claimed that although the USGA is literally not a “place,” it does, for the
purposes of conducting its championships, “operate[s] a place of public
accommodation,” as provided for in the statute.207 Thus, the court concluded, due to
the control the USGA has over the courses before, during, and after its tournaments,
that it does indeed operate a place of public accommodation, therefore falling under
the control of Title III of the ADA.208
The USGA also argued that the competition areas of the U.S. Open and its
qualifying rounds is off limits to the general public, so only the spectator areas
should be governed by the ADA.209 The court cited a number of cases where the
NCAA ruled on the eligibility of college student-athletes, and the courts did not find
that the competitive areas—i.e. pool, court, or field—were outside the reach of the
ADA.210 In each of these cases, however, eligibility pending upon the plaintiff’s
ability to perform academically, not athletically, was the issue.
The USGA also argued that it should be enabled, as an organizer of a
championship event, to make its own rules of competition. It cited New York
Roadrunners Club v. State Division of Human Resources,211 “which held that
because the New York City Marathon is a footrace, its organizers had no obligation
to allow other means of locomotion. . . .”212 The plaintiff countered, saying that if
that were to be so, sports would become the only industry “allowed to construct
barriers to access that are unrelated to performance.”213 The court called this
argument “simply another version of [the USGA] argument that [it] is exempt from
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the provisions of the ADA,” and denied the USGA’s motion for summary
judgment.214
2. Trial
The issue pursued at trial was the USGA’s argument that the accommodation that
Olinger requested, a golf cart, would fundamentally alter the nature of the U.S. Open
and its qualifying rounds.215 The court, following trial, agreed with the USGA.216
As the court pointed out, “fundamentally alter” comes from Southeastern
Community College v. Davis,217 a case under the Rehabilitation Act218 that interpreted
“reasonable accommodation.”219 The Rehabilitation Act language is so similar to the
ADA, that the “reasonable accommodations” analysis is “easily transferable to the
Title III . . . context.”220
The court examined the initial burden, on the plaintiff, to provide that the
accommodation is reasonable in the general sense, noting that the “golf cart has
become so ubiquitous in the sport that any such challenge would seem doomed.”221
That being established, the USGA must prove that the accommodation would
fundamentally alter the nature of the tournament: “Proof must focus on the specific
circumstances rather than on reasonableness in general.”222 Thus, the USGA must
show that the use of a golf cart in U.S. Open and its qualifying rounds would
fundamentally alter the competition.
The USGA claimed that since the U.S. Open is the national golf championship,
the standards for competition must be higher than those of its other tournaments.223
For instance, its U.S. Senior Open, in which competitors are at least fifty-five years
old or more, is not a test of stamina like the U.S. Open.224 Also, other tournaments
that do not bestow the winner with “national champion” status do allow golf carts,
but often that is due to the fact that the tournaments are held during school months,
thus there is a shortage of students to act as caddies.225 As a result, “the court sees no
inconsistency in . . . allowing carts in some events while barring them in what they
view as the national championship.”226 Through the court’s findings, many derived
214
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from a study of walking fatigue while playing golf reported by an expert
physiologist, Dr. James Rippe, show “not that a golfer who rides invariably has a
competitive advantage over a very similar golfer who walks; . . . only that a strong
possibility exists that on any particular day, such a competitive advantage might
exist, and that it might be substantial.”227
The court also noted that even a slight competitive advantage could affect the
outcome of the U.S. Open. “Slightly over 100 U.S. Opens have been played, and on
30 occasions, a playoff was needed to decide the winner, so a single stroke can be
determinative.”228 Additionally, although the court conceded this was not part of the
trial record, “a single stroke would have an impact on money won or lost below the
levels of first and second places.”229
The court was also cautious about the precedent it would set if it allowed Olinger
the use of a golf cart, stating that if the “inquiry moves beyond . . . Olinger, the issue
broadens and becomes more difficult . . . Olinger must ride a golf cart to play, and
even with a cart he is likely to be more fatigued at the end [of a round] than a healthy
Tiger Woods or healthy David Duval.”230 The court anticipated that later someone
else may apply for a golf cart, and the same thing will be said:
But how will that applicant be compared to Ford Olinger? Will next
year’s applicant . . . have a competitive advantage over Olinger if allowed
to ride? Will Mr. Olinger have a competitive advantage over next year’s
applicant if both are allowed to ride? If either would have an advantage
over the other, would one be allowed to ride? or both? or neither?231
The court also noted that it was able to decide whether Olinger was to use a golf
cart with the help of many attorneys who provided far more information to the court
then it ultimately needed, in the form of briefs, testimony, and other evidence.232 It
also noted that the USGA does not ask for all of the information that these skilled
attorneys were able to provide.233 Of course it could, “but the USGA then also would
need to develop a system and a fund of expertise to determine whether a given
applicant truly needs, or merely wants, or could use but does not need, to ride a cart
to compete.”234
“It is important . . . not to allow ‘stamina’ or ‘nature of the program’ to become a
proxy for discrimination against persons protected by the ADA.”235 However, the
court stated that, unlike the workplace,
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The point of athletic competition . . . is to decide who, under conditions
that are about the same for everyone, can perform an assigned set of tasks
better than . . . any other competitor. The set of tasks assigned to the
competitor in the U.S. Open includes not merely striking a golf ball with
precision, but doing so under greater than usual mental and physical
stress.236
As a result, the district court held that, although the accommodation Olinger
sought was reasonable in a general sense, granting it would fundamentally alter the
nature of the competition in the U.S. Open.237
B. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Decision
After the District Court’s ruling, Olinger appealed the decision to the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals.238 The nature of Olinger’s appeal centers on the evidence
that the USGA offered at trial. He contended that it lacked a nexus between his
“personal circumstances as they interacted with the USGA’s event—that in fact
allowing a cart would fundamentally alter the event.”239 Olinger also asserted that
the USGA did not show that “impossible administrative burdens” would be imposed
upon it if it were to allow Olinger to use a golf cart.240 The court began its analysis
of the Olinger case with an extensive background of the history and tradition of the
U.S. Open, reaching the conclusion that “the U.S. Open is the greatest test in golf.”241
The court asserted that, as the District Court did, this case can be resolved upon the
narrow issue of whether Olinger’s “use of a cart during the tournament would
fundamentally alter the nature of the competition.”242
The court then thoroughly analyzed Title III provisions and its key terminology
much like the court below had done, finding that the use of a golf cart by Olinger
“would alter the fundamental nature of that competition . . .” by removing a
“particular type of stamina.”243 The testimony of three witnesses, Ken Venturi, Dr.
Theodore Holland, and Dennis Hepler, are relied on in the court’s opinion as
evidence of the above finding.244 Venturi, the 1964 U.S. Open champion, testified at
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trial to the conditions he overcame to win the tournament that year, as well as the
story of Ben Hogan’s dramatic victory in 1950.245
Dr. Holland testified that physical endurance and stamina are vital factors in
determining the U.S. Open champion, saying that “[t]here is a lot more to getting . . .
around those seventy-two holes than just hitting the shots.”246 Much like Holland,
Olinger’s own witness, Hepler, “testified that physical endurance and stamina and
uniform rules are critical factors in determining the national golf champion.”247
The court, in closing, and without discussion, adopted the District Court’s
holding that to require the USGA to examine each request for a golf cart would
impose undue administrative burdens upon it.248
Accordingly, the court affirmed the decision of the court below, and noted that it
is not deciding whether the “USGA should give seriously disabled . . . golfers a
chance to compete,” but rather are required to do so.249 Ultimately, the court held
they will not grant Olinger’s request for a golf cart, “[b]ecause the law does not force
the USGA to make the accommodation Olinger seeks.”250
V. MARTIN AND OLINGER DO NOT MEET THE STATUTORY DEFINITION OF DISABLED
With the publicity that is attached to an attraction such as professional golf, it
was not long before scholars weighed in on the decisions reached in both Martin and
Olinger. Some found the golfers’ claims reasonable, and others said that “big
brother again undermined a private organization’s ability to set its own rules.”251
As noted above, the PGA stipulated to Martin’s disability, which is the plaintiff’s
initial burden when filing an ADA claim.252 After hearing of his condition, one has
little doubt that Martin is disabled. Or is he? Similarly, the USGA stipulated to
Olinger’s disability,253 and the Social Security Administration has determined that
Olinger is disabled, but those regulations have nothing to do with the ADA.254 One
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scholar asserts that both Martin and Olinger, as professional athletes, may not even
qualify as “disabled” under the ADA, making any claim under that law doomed from
the outset.255
Under the ADA, a person must meet three necessary elements to qualify as
disabled: (1) “physical or mental impairment” that (2) “substantially limits” a (3)
“major life activity.”256 Clearly, both golfers have “physical impairments,” but does
either substantially limit a major life activity?
There are no specific criteria for “major life activity” provided by either the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or Congress.257 However, the “major
life activities” that they have recognized share three characteristics, which have been
described as a “Frequency-Universality Test.”258 An activity meets this test, and
thereby qualifies as a “major life activity,” if it is performed with microfrequency
(throughout the day), macrofrequency (daily or almost daily), and universally (by
almost everyone, except those prevented from doing so by an impairment).259
Under that test, query what possible “major life activity” are these two men being
prevented from doing? Walking, golfing, or golfing professionally are three
possibilities. If the claim is that the “major life activity” is walking, are both
plaintiffs “substantially limited” as the statute requires? Consider that both men do
indeed walk while playing a round of golf; that is, they do not hit their shots from the
golf cart. They must still walk from the golf cart to the ball and back, which, it is
estimated, is still twenty-five percent of the course, or roughly one and one-quarter
miles for a round of eighteen holes.260 It is reasonable to assume, for the sake of
argument, that these two professionals play golf six days per week. If so, that is
roughly seven and one-half miles of walking per week during golf alone. It is
doubtful that this would qualify under the universal prong of the test, for few persons
walk that far on a weekly basis.
With the next two possibilities, golf, and more narrowly, professional golf, the
prospect of either of these men satisfying the test becomes increasingly remote. The
typical golfer may, and usually does, spend large amounts of time at his or her game,
but the number of able-bodied persons participating in golf could hardly be termed
“universal.” By even greater logic, the argument that professional golf is a “major
life activity” becomes impossible to make. “In fact, even though professional
athletes . . . may participate in sports for a large portion of the day, every day,
255
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participation in sports must fail the universality test because unimpaired people
commonly choose not to participate in sports.”261 Thus, there is a distinct
“possibility that in cases where the disability is not stipulated and where courts
require that a plaintiff prove the disability [while] further requiring a showing that a
major life activity is substantially limited, the professional athlete may run into
difficulty.”262
Another possible “major life activity,” as it applies to these cases is “working.”
Even though neither court found grounds for a Title I claim,263 which covers
employee/employer relationships under the ADA, that does not preclude the
determination of “working” as a major life activity. It stands to reason that even if
both plaintiffs are judged to be independent contractors, rather than employees of the
respective defendants, both could still be considered to be working as they compete
for the tournament purse.
The U.S. Supreme Court, in Sutton v. United Air Lines, analyzed the statutory
definition of disabled.264 The Court determined “[w]hen the major life activity under
consideration is that of working, the statutory phrase ‘substantially limits’ requires,
at minimum, that Plaintiffs allege they are unable to work in a broad class of
jobs.”265 The Court also looked to the EEOC’s definition of “substantially limits” as
applied to the major life activity of working, which states “[t]he inability to perform
a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life
activity of working.”266 The Court concluded, therefore, “[i]f jobs utilizing an
individual’s skills (but perhaps not his or her unique talents) are available, one is not
precluded from a substantial class of jobs. Similarly, if a host of different types of
jobs are available, one is not precluded from a broad range of jobs.”267 Since Olinger
works as a club pro, and Martin is a graduate of Stanford University with a degree in
economics, neither appears to be limited from a broad class of jobs.268
Sutton therefore held that the Plaintiffs—who claimed the Defendants failure to
hire them as commercial airline pilots because of poor vision was a Title I
violation—were not “disabled” under the ADA’s meaning.269 Applying the Court’s
261
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analysis to Martin and Olinger, absent stipulations to the respective Plaintiff’s
disabilities, and extending the definition of “major life activity” that the high Court
used in its Title I claim to our Title III claims, it is likely, again, that Martin and
Olinger would fail to meet the ADA definition of “disabled.”
VI. SUBSTANTIVE RULES OF ATHLETICS WERE NOT MEANT TO BE
GOVERNED BY THE ADA
Another argument not presented at length in the analysis of either court, but
mentioned briefly in Olinger, is that the ADA should not apply to the competitive
component of athletics. “The point of an athletic competition . . . is to decide who,
under conditions that are about the same for everyone, can perform an assigned set of
tasks better than (not as well as) any other competitor.”270 Athletics present a far
different question than do workplace claims under Title I, in which “the pertinent
inquiry is whether a particular otherwise qualified individual can perform a job if a
reasonable accommodation is made to allow for the person’s disability.”271 Title III
prohibits eligibility criteria that “screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a
disability . . . from fully and equally enjoying any goods [and] services . . ..”272
Professional athletics isn’t about “enjoyment” and access; it is about competition and
huge winnings. The Title III claims presented by these two golfers not only ask for
access, but also for the chance to compete and win.273
[I]t is . . . without question that . . . Martin’s use of a cart places him in a
much better position than if he were forced to compete without the use of
a cart. Given the format of professional golf . . . allowing . . . Martin to
use a cart during competitive play will undoubtedly permit him to finish
higher, thereby receiving a greater winning.274
An important difference between all of the ADA cases that are cited in support of
the plaintiff in Martin, many of which are NCAA eligibility cases, is that they
regulate the access athletics, while Martin and Olinger want the rules changed after
they have already gained access. “What is most threatening to professional sports
about the Martin decision is not that [he] was given the opportunity to compete on
the professional level, but rather that a court altered competition in order to do so.”275
Adam Jay Golden, writing in the Sports Law Journal, sets forth an excellent
example of how judicial interference with the substantive, competitive rules of golf
could present itself in other sports; he used baseball as an example.276 Golden asks
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you to assume that a Major League Baseball (“MLB”) pitcher has the same disorder
as Martin, and that he has all the skills necessary to be a MLB pitcher, but he cannot
remain standing for long periods of time.277 “In order to continue competing in
professional baseball, the pitcher requests that MLB permit him to place a chair next
to the pitcher’s mound so that he may sit when he is in the act of pitching.”278 This is
an obviously absurd mental picture.
Most people who know anything about baseball would agree that placing a chair
in the middle of a baseball diamond is a ridiculous accommodation. The same
people will also tell you that standing for long periods of time is not a skill that is
fundamental to becoming a big league pitcher. Nonetheless, Golden correctly states
that if you were to go through the same ADA analysis as in Martin, you may find
yourself watching a game that features a folding chair as part of the baseball
landscape.279 For even though the accommodation of a “chair on a baseball diamond
is more foreign than that of a golf cart on a golf course, the oddity of such an
accommodation would not alter the legal analysis . . . .”280 The Martin court, for
instance, ruled that the purpose of any rule cannot be mere tradition.281 So, MLB
could not offer such argument, nor an argument of unsightliness, to defeat this
hypothetical accommodation.282
The Supreme Court made a similar argument during oral arguments in Martin.283
The Court cited the designated hitter rule in MLB as an illustration of how a sport
can be played under two different sets of rules, just like in professional golf.284 In the
American League, one of the two MLB leagues, the pitcher is replaced in the batting
order by a designated hitter; yet in the National League the pitcher bats. The Court
asked Martin’s attorney, Roy L. Reardon of New York, if a pitcher with a blood
deficiency that causes him to tire easily should be entitled to relief from hitting if he
played in the National League, because the designated hitter rule couldn’t be
“fundamental” since it is in only one of the Major Leagues.285 Reardon responded
that the National League rule requiring the pitcher to bat is fundamental, and
changing that rule would be impermissible.286
The Court, unable to tell the difference between the PGA golf cart rule and the
American League designated hitter rule, responded that it couldn’t understand “the
whole meaning of fundamentalness with regard to sport.”287 It then asked the
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Respondent if a player had a disability that caused an unusually long torso, could
baseball change the strike zone, which is normally from the knees to the chest, and
make it smaller for him.288 Reardon again responded that the strike zone is a
fundamental rule.289 The Court responded by calling the strike zone a “silly rule,”
and saying “[a]ll sports rules are silly rules. . . .”290 Clearly, the point the Court was
trying to make is that all sports are governed by rules that are arbitrarily created to
put all competitors on a level playing field and test them—not to discriminate against
disabled people. Granted, a person born with unusually short arms would be
discriminated against if he were to try out for quarterback of a football team. A
dwarf would be discriminated against if he were to try out for a basketball team; that
is the very nature of athletics.
Sometimes hyperbole is the only way to make an argument effective; sometimes
extending an apparently logical argument to an extreme shows how it is actually
illogical. The above examples demonstrate the primary point of Olinger, that the
purpose of athletics is to compete under the same conditions, and then see who is
victorious. An extension of Martin changes that goal; hence, the ADA should not
apply to competitive athletics.
VII. CONCLUSION
After reading the above, it is understandable how many people would cry that the
PGA is being cold-hearted, and how they should allow Martin to compete. It is a
terrible condition that he suffers from; likewise, Olinger suffers from a condition that
severely curtails his ability to walk. Moreover, there are many other persons quietly
suffering from terrible medical conditions, which have no cure, who cannot even
find work, let alone compete in professional athletics.
The ADA is not a panacea for those who wish to participate in professional
sports. Nor was its design to ensure that this nation went without suffering. The
ADA was implemented to ensure that disabled Americans could get into the
factories, movie houses, and ballparks of their communities. Most of the cases cited
in support by both golfers are those which an athlete gained access to an event that
he would have been barred from were it not for the ADA. This Note’s primary
contention is that access is where the ADA needs to stop—before it changes the
substantive rules, and consequently, the overall nature, of athletics. Nowhere did
Martin, Olinger, nor any of the courts cite a case that even proposed that rules of
competition should be changed so an athlete can compete. Nevertheless, in light of
the Supreme Court’s decision in Martin, the “world of professional sports may
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forever be altered.”291 But rest assured, “[t]he year was 2001, and ‘everybody was
finally equal.’”292
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